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I.

INTRODUCTION

Investment in private equity originally came from individual investors and corporations.
However, over the years institutional investors have become prominent in the investor pool with
the hope of achieving risk adjusted returns. Banks have become significant sources of funds in
the private equity market. Bank affiliate groups account for a significant share of the private
equity activity as well as the banks’ own capital.
A distinct feature of a leveraged buyout by a private equity firm as opposed to strategic
buyouts and other transactions is the significant reliance on debt financing. Typically, shell
companies with substantially no assets would be formed by the private equity firms to effect the
buyout. A substantial portion of this buyout would be funded by investment banks or possibly
commercial banks, issuing high yield debt and other related financial offerings. This structure
makes the banks very crucial players in the buyout and exposes them directly to the risk of the
upshot of the buyout.
Private equity opens avenues for diversified and promising returns. But, investment in
private equity, perceived as more risky and volatile as opposed to other publicly traded
securities, is being viewed by the government as less favorable in the current market dynamics.
The nature of these businesses being high leveraged, make them more likely to falter in a crisis,
thus adding to the systemic risk of the investors.
In 2007, the housing bubble burst and the economy took a hit, exposing a host of risky
lending and investment practices. The banking sector was especially found at the center of the
economic ruin. Banks involved in a variety of arenas outside the conventional commercial
banking sphere became particularly critical in this economic situation. The regulators’ approach
towards the banks has been censorious in various respects.
Owing to the nature of private equity investment practice and the economic conditions of
the US market, Section 619 of the Dodd Frank Act, known as the Volcker Rule, was proposed
prohibiting banks from investing in proprietary trading and further banning investment in hedge
funds and private equity, with the view that such funds can be alternative vehicles for proprietary
trading. The regulatory agencies currently are in the process of formulating rules in connection
with the new law. Having opened the floor for comment from various financial entities, experts,
international organizations and individuals, the legislators have received mixed responses to the
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proposed rules. This paper critically examines the rules by putting forward different perspectives
towards their implementation and effects.

II.

BANK INVESTMENT IN PRIVATE EQUITY

Before examining the intricacies and implications of regulations that govern the private
equity industry, it is important to understand and digest the basic skeletal structure of private
equity financing, specifically the debt aspect of it. The history of private equity finance has been
a history of changing regulation, changing investment cultures and changing access to debt and
sources of debt.1 Fundamentally, private equity transactions are leveraged buyouts (LBOs), a
significant portion of which is covered by debt. The debt and investment structures have a
significantly role played by commercial and investment banks. Therefore, the structure of private
equity investment has been tied into the willingness and capacity of the banks and financial
institutions to facilitate the leverages buyouts2.
Private equity firms are business and investment management organizations, many of
which were originally divisions of investment banks or were begun by partners after leaving the
acquisition arm of an investment bank. Many prominent investment banks operate private equity
divisions that compete with other firms. These firms solicit capital from investors and that capital
is then pooled as a fund that is a separate legal entity from the private equity firm.3
During the beginning of the 2000s, the bear market encouraged banks to turn to private
equity as a good source of alternative investment where they can claim to deliver returns on a
variety of market conditions. Commercial banks also became more inclined towards providing
high levels of leverage on larger levels of debt. LBO debt raised in 2004–05 in the U.S. market
amounted to $200 billion, or 5 percent of total corporate debt outstanding. 4 An additional
1

JAMIE MORGAN, PRIVATE EQUITY FINANCE 3 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009)
Id. at 13
3
Id. at 4
4
International Monetary Fund- Monetary and Capital Markets Department, Global Financial Stability Report:
Market Development and Issues (April 2006) available at
http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2006/01/pdf/chp1.pdf. See also Lily Fang, Victoria Ivashine & Josh
Lerner, Unstable Equity- Combining Banking with private Equity Investing (Harvard Business School, Working
Paper No. 10-106, 2010). Over the period between 1983 and 2009, over one-quarter of all private equity investments
involved bank-affiliated private equity groups. Between 1997 and 2006, the total amount of transactions done by
bank-affiliated private equity firms represented on average 9.4% of the bank’s total equity during this period
2
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advantage that bank debt brings to the table is that banks offer better terms as they want to sell
other fee based services to the private equity firms and the private equity firms believe that their
bank relationships are a competitive advantage.5 In the light of all the factors discussed, banks
have found an influential presence in the private equity industry.
When the economy was thriving, they were not concerned by bad debts and defaults.
However, this was no longer the same with the dawn of the economic slump. The question that
had arisen in the light of the financial crisis was about the ‘liquidity’ of the private equity market.
It is this very liquidity characteristic or private equity that gave impetus to for the leveraged
buyouts to grow in terms of scale and frequency over the years.6 The availability of debt as a
significant share of financing gave private equity the inherent tendency to grow. As a result,
private equity buyouts began to create more vulnerable acquisitions with higher levels of
leverage and complex debt structures. Consequentially private equity finance developed an
element of dis-functional and unstable liquidity.7 The instability of liquidity resulting in periodic
adverse economic conditions and problems within the financial system raised the issue of
whether private equity finance must be regulated and how.8
Sensing the trend of banking behaviors and change in the economic climate, Mr. Rodrigo
De Rato, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund at the 37th Washington
Conference of the Council of the Americas pointed that “I (also) see significant risks in the
recent increase in large private equity buyouts financed by a rising proportion of debt, as well as
the deteriorating credit quality of leveraged loans. From a financial stability perspective, if some
of these deals were to turn sour, it could trigger a reappraisal of risk, which would curtail market
access more broadly for lower-rated corporate borrowers. This could adversely affect investment
and growth prospects.”9

according to the study conducted and reported by the authors.
5
Victoria Ivashina & Anna Kovner, The Private Equity Advantage: Leveraged Buyout Firms and Relationship
Banking, EFA 2008 Athens Meetings Paper, (April 5, 2010) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017857##
6 Morgan, supra note 1, at 14
7
Morgan, supra note 1, at 14
8
Morgan, supra note 1, at 8
9
Rotrigo de Rato, Managing Director Of the International Monetary Fund, Speech at the 37th Washington
Conference of the Council of the Americas (May 2, 2007) available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2007/050207.htm
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III.

PAUL VOLCKER AND THE HISTORY OF THE RULE

After the great depression in the 1920s, the regulators focused on building a firewall
between bank and investment banks with the objective to keep the commercial banks from
dramatic economic fluctuations.10 To give effect to that approach, the Banking Act of 1933,
popularly called the Glass- Steagall Act, was passed. The primary objective of the legislation
was to protect the American saver from the unwarranted risks the banks resort to taking with
their money.11 Commercial banks activities involving securities dealings were severely curbed.12
The 1999 passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, also known as the Financial Services
Modernization Act of 1999, effectively reversed the changes made by the Glass-Steagall Act.13 It
pulled down the wall between commercial and investment banking and lifted the ban on
proprietary trading activities of the banks.14 This marked the beginning of a disaster, believed
many financial experts and academics.15 Less than a decade after the deregulation, these same
financial entities were at the epicenter of a global financial crisis that began in 2007 as they
aggressively involved in riskier credits including leveraged loans.16
Paul Volcker, the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the
economic advisor to the President has argued strongly that the repeal of Glass-Steagall, allowing
financial firms to grow big in part by merging conventional banking with investment activities,

10

Steven Pearlstein, Lets Shatter the Myth on Glass-Steagall, The Washington Post, July 28, 2012 available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lets-shatter-the-myth-on-glass-steagall/2012/07/27/gJQASaOAGX_story.html
11
DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL- UNDERSTANDING THE DODD FRANK ACT AND ITS
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 1 (John Wiley & Sons, 2011)
12
Matthew Richardson, Roy C. Smith & Ingo Walter, Large Banks and the Volcker Rule, in REGULATING WALL
STREET 187 (John Wiley & Sons, 2011)- Senator Carter Glass and other contemporary critics of the universal
banking model feared that bank involvement in securities and leveraged debt had directly and indirectly led banks to
ramp up their holdings of long term financial instruments, exposing themselves to potentially dangerous market,
credit and liquidity risk.
13
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106–02, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
14
JAMES R. BARTH, R. DAN BRUMBAUGH JR., AND JAMES A. WILCOX, THE REPEAL OF GLASS
STEAGALL AND THE ADVENT OF BROAD BANKING 1 (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 2000)
available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2005615866“Since the barriers that separated banking from other financial activities have been crumbling for some time, GLBA
is better viewed as ratifying, rather than revolutionizing, the practice of banking”.
This legislation was brought into force with the objective to ‘enhance competition in the financial services industry
by providing a prudential framework for the affiliation of banks and other financial service providers.
15
Robert Kuttner, Co-founder and Co-editor of The American Prospect, Testimony before the Committee on
Financial Services Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman U.S. House of Representatives Washington D.C (Oct. 2, 2007)
available at http://prospect.org/article/alarming-parallels-between-1929-and-2007
16
Supra note 12, at 191
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was the primary factor that set the stage for the crisis.17 He had been waging a campaign to curb
greed and speculation on Wall Street.18 His position is that banks whose fundamental function is
to provide credit to consumers and business deserve governmental assistance and protection only
to the extent that they restrict their role to conventional banking activities and not extend their
scope into risky and unstable areas like proprietary trading and private equity- hedge fund
investments.19 He said “We need to break up our biggest banks and return to the basic split of
activities that existed under the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933- one highly regulated (and somewhat
boring) set of banks to run the payments system, and a completely separate set of financial
entities to help firms raise capital (and to trade securities).”20
With respect to the specific investment and debt role played by banks in hedge funds and
private equity, Volcker supports his approach in the followings ways:21
1.

Leveraged debt places bank capital at risk in the search of speculative

profit rather than in response to customer needs- Looking at private equity in specific,
these investments are distinguished from conventional business processes particularly
because they are based on subjective and disputable assessments of businesses, that are
attached with the risk of failure in performance. Mr. Volcker emphasizes that leveraged
loans jeopardize the interests of the pool of customers that are involved in traditional
banking activities.
2.

These activities present virtually insolvable conflicts of interest with

customer relationships- Mr. Volcker opined that these conflicts cannot be resolved by
merely making divisions in the Banks activities. These walls of divisions cannot be made
distinct and concrete because they would at every stage face the difficulty of overlapping
customer interests. Banks provide the essential intermediating function of matching the
need for safe and readily available depositories for liquid funds with the need for reliable

17

Paul Krugman, Six Doctrines in Search of a Policy Regime, N.Y. Times, April 18, 2010 available at
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/18/six-doctrines-in-search-of-a-policy-regime/
18
John Cassidy, The Volcker Rule- Obama’s Economic Advisor and His Battle over The Financial-Reforms Bill, The
New Yorker, July 26, 2010 available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/07/26/100726fa_fact_cassidy
19
Id.
20
Simon Johnson, Paul Volcker Finds a Hammer, N.Y. Times, Dec 17, 2009 available at
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/17/paul-volcker-finds-a-hammer/
21
Paul Volcker, How to Reform Our Financial System, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 2010 available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/opinion/31volcker.html
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sources of credit for businesses, individuals and governments22. Private equity and hedge
fund investment, as per Mr. Volcker’s perception, make the necessary liquid funds shrink
in quantity and unsafe in quality.
3.

The private capital market institutions are in no way entirely dependent on

the commercial banks- the private equity and hedge fund institutions, though widely
varying in size and characteristics, are inherently capable of maintaining innovative
competitive markets.23 They are typically financed privately and heavily dependent on
non-banking and private investors for a substantial portion of their investments.
Commercial banks only tilts a “level playing field” without clear value added. 24 Mr.
Volcker’s school of thought believe that taking away certain banking sources for
investment would not be detrimental to private equity.
4.

Only a small group of banks are involved in leveraged debt- Mr. Volcker

argues that only a handful of large banks, which are actively involved in private equity
investment, are vital to the performance of the respective industries. 25 Other financial
institutions are not significantly present in the private equity or hedge fund markets. He
characterizes private equity and hedge fund institutions as having no adverse
consequences for the viability of economy in general and therefore, proposed that
regulation of those areas would not significantly affect the bigger picture.26 Those who
endorse the regulation also argue that this regulation is only restricting flight and not
cutting the wings of the financial institutions altogether. They would still be free to
innovate, to trade, to speculate, to manage private pools of capital and as ordinary
businesses in a capitalist economy, to fail”.27
With this outlook, Mr. Volker convinced the policy makers that clarifying the range of
trading activity appropriate for commercial banks in support of customer relationships and
regulating them effectively is what is required to streamline banking activities that determine the
22

Id.
Id.
24
Id.
25
Supra note 12, at 191.
26
Id. Contrary to what is stated, in 2009, the world’s five largest wholesale banks were responsible for the
origination of nearly 60% all capital market transactions. The figures speak for themselves and clearly dispute the
reasoning given by Mr. Volcker that private equity transactions are not significant enough to have a noticeable effect
on the economy.
27
Id.
23
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fate of the economy to a prodigious extent. He strongly advocated the approach of structural
changes. The Obama government taking this approach into serious consideration, did not take
the extreme measure of resetting the clock on banks, which would not for obvious reasons be
taken well by the target banks. They instead, looked in the direction of measures to restrict the
activities of the banks in certain specific ways. This approach took shape in the form of Section
619 of the Dodd Frank Act.

IV.

THE PROPOSED LAW

Section 61928 of the Dodd Frank Act states that:
PROHIBITIONS ON PROPRIETARY TRADING AND CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH
HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS.

The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 is amended by adding at the end the following:
“SEC.

13.

PROHIBITIONS

ON

PROPRIETARY

TRADING

AND

CERTAIN

RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS.
(a) IN GENERAL- (1) PROHIBITION—Unless otherwise provided in this section, a

banking entity shall not— (A) engage in proprietary trading; or

(B) acquire or retain

any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor a hedge fund or a
private equity fund.

(2) NONBANK FINANCIAL COMPANIES SUPERVISED BY THE

BOARD- Any nonbank financial company supervised by the Board that engages in

proprietary trading or takes or retains any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest
in or sponsors a hedge fund or a private equity fund shall be subject, by rule, as provided
in subsection (b)(2), to additional capital requirements for and additional quantitative
limits with regards to such proprietary trading and taking or retaining any equity,
partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsorship of a hedge fund or a private
equity fund, except that permitted activities as described in subsection (d) shall not be
subject to the additional capital and additional quantitative limits except as provided in
subsection (d)(3), as if the nonbank financial company supervised by the Board were a
28

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) &
Bank Holding Companies Act, 12 U.S.C. 1851
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banking entity.
The fundamental approach underlying this provision that President Obama adopted as a
measure to address the financial crisis, is to end the mentality of treating banks as ‘too big to
fail’. 29 This provision generally prohibits any banking entity from engaging in proprietary
trading or from acquiring or retaining an ownership interest in, sponsoring, or having certain
relationships with a hedge fund or private equity fund 30 (‘covered fund’), subject to certain
exemptions.31 The Rule takes effect upon the earlier of twelve months after the issuance of final
implementing rules and two years after the date the Volcker Rule was enacted (July 21, 2012).32
The Act further requires the various regulatory agencies to formulate rules to give effect to and
monitor the implementation of the provision.33
In formulating the proposed rules as per the provisions of the Act, the Federal Agencies34
have attempted to replicate the structure of Section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act, which
is to prohibit a banking entity from engaging in proprietary trading or acquiring or retaining an
ownership interest in, or having certain relationships with, a covered fund, while permitting such
entities to continue to provide client-oriented financial services.35 The Agencies acknowledge
that while it is crucial that the rules clearly define and implement the statutory requirements, they
must also preserve the ability of a banking entity to continue to structure its businesses and
manage its risks in a safe and sound manner, as well as to effectively deliver to its clients the

29

Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Calls for New Restrictions on Size and Scope of
Financial Institutions to rein in excesses and Protect Tax Payers (Jan. 21, 2010) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-calls-new-restrictions-size-and-scope-financialinstitutions-rein-e
30
‘Hedge fund’ and ‘private equity fund’ are defined under Section 13(f)(2), as amended by Section 619 of the
Dodd Frank Act, as “a company or other entity that is exempt from registration as an investment company pursuant
to section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(1) or 80a-3(c)(7) or such
similar funds as determined by the appropriate Federal banking agencies.”
31
See 12 U.S.C. 1851 (which lays out the general prohibitions, permitted activities, the limitations, exceptions,
rulemaking provisions and rules of construction according to which this provision must be implemented and
interpreted.)
32
Supra note 28
33
To provide greater definition, the newly created Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) was also directed
to undertake a study of the Volcker Rule, including recommendations regarding its implementation. The Financial
Services Roundtable, Report on The Economic Impact of the Dodd Frank Act (June, 2012) available at
http://www.fsround.org/fsr/publications_and_research/files/Economic-Impact-Dodd-Frank-Act-June-2012.pdf
34
Department of the Treasury, Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Depository Insurance Corporation and
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
35
Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with Hedge Funds
and Private Equity Funds, Fed. Reg. (Proposed Nov. 7, 2011)
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types of financial services that are permitted. 36 Considering this issue, the Agencies and
regulatory authorities have afforded significant time and scope to assess the responses of key
industrial players that would potentially be concerned with the rules so as to implement them by
incorporating the proposed changes while keeping the essence of the provisions intact.37 The
proposed rules will be finally designed to clarify the scope of the Volcker Rule’s prohibitions on
proprietary trading and hedge fund or private equity fund ownership and identify transactions
and activities excepted from those prohibitions, as well as the limitations on those exceptions.38

V.

RESPONSES TO THE PROPOSED RULE

The private equity industry has seen a dramatic growth. For instance, in the United States
in 2006 alone, leveraged buyouts firms raised over $148 billions and accounted for almost 17%
of all mergers and acquisitions.39 A substantial portion of these transactions is financed with
syndicated bank loans.40 Private equity firms are important clients for banks, since the frequency
and scale of their transactions are larger than those of traditional borrowers. 41 The statutory
restrictions under the new legislation and the proposed federal rules, have therefore attracted
strong reactions from various banks and private equity participants. The reactions are noted as
follows:
1.

Banks: 42 The primary concerns that banks and their group associations

have raised are that:

36

Id.
Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor of the Federal Reserve System, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Capital
Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises and the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.: The Volcker Rule (Jan.
18, 2012) available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/tarullo20120118a.htm
38
Daniel M. Gallagher, Commissioner of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks at the Credit
Suisse Global Equity Trading Forum (Feb. 17, 2012) available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch021712dmg.htm
39
Supra note 5.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Supra note 38 “The Proposal would reduce market liquidity, increase market volatility, impede capital formation,
harm U.S. individual investors, pension funds, endowments, asset managers, corporations, governments, and other
market participants, impinge on the safety and soundness of the U.S. banking system, and constrain U.S. economic
growth and job creation”
37
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i)

Vagueness and Complexity: “The banking industry fears the oversized

nature and complexity of this proposed rule will make it unworkable and will further
inhibit U.S. banks' ability to serve customers and compete internationally. It's clear
from the proposal that many important details remain unresolved. More questions are
asked than answered”.43 The burden on banks and regulators of complex, crosscutting and incomprehensible rules will consequently be the most significant
impediment to financial-market recovery and robust economic growth.44
ii)

Lending and credit limitations: Whatever form it may take, lending is the

primary function of the bank on which it thrives. The proposed regulations pose a
serious threat to banking entities by limiting their ability to lend through partnership
structures and similarly structured credit funds. 45 Credit funds, particularly private
equity funds, help banks diversify their risk and help them secure the supply of credit
especially during the periods of market distress.46 The proposed rules are likely to
reduce that stream of credit and limit the scope of lending activities.
iii)

Economic viability: One important concern that the Bankers share is the

economic impact on their activities that will result from the implementation of the
rule. Modern banking entities, like other corporate entities have been organizing
themselves across different business lines by using wholly owned subsidiaries, joint
ventures and such47. The Proposed Rule by categorizing the investments as ‘covered
funds’, subjects the banks to severe restrictions on inter-company transactions48. This
will thereby create extensive compliance costs and operational burdens, and is likely
to restrict institutions from structuring themselves effectively.4950

43

Frank Keating, President and CEO of the American Bankers Association, Statement of Comment on the Volcker
Rule (Oct. 11, 2011) available at http://www.aba.com/Press/Pages/101111VolckerRuleStatement.aspx.
The broad scope of the rule raises exceedingly high number of practical questions that the Agencies will most
definitely encounter when the complex concepts behind the rule are applied to reality.
44
The Financial Services Roundtable, Report on The Economic Impact of the Dodd Frank Act (June, 2012)
available at http://www.fsround.org/fsr/publications_and_research/files/Economic-Impact-Dodd-Frank-Act-June2012.pdf
45
John F.W. Roger, Chief of Staff of Goldman Sachs Group JP, Statement of Comment on the Volcker Rule (Feb.
13, 2012) available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-353.pdf
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
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The estimates show that banks will have to spend nearly 6.6 million hours to
implement the rule, of which more than 1.8 million hours would be required every year
in perpetuity.51 That translates into 3,292 years, or more than 3,000 bank employees
whose sole job will be complying with this rule.52 They will be transferred to a role
that provides compromised customer service, generates minimal revenue and does more
harm for the economy than good.
iv) Global impact- the Dodd Frank Act was passed with the objective of
causing a foundational change and achieving international conformity. But, the banks
believe that this trend would only be deleterious to their business. Foreign banks and
financial institutions from other countries can potentially take advantage of the
limitations of their American counterparts to capture their industry and would be
eagerly awaiting the opportunity to pick up customers and lines of business that
American banks will be forced to abandon.53 The Proposed Rule would also cause
U.S. banking entities with foreign presence to incur substantial expense in rebranding
and restructuring their public foreign funds, while foreign competitors would not be
bound by such expenses or the restrictions globally and therefore would enjoy a clear
cost advantage.54 The Rule restricts U.S. banking entities' global operations, whereas
it only restricts foreign banking entities' U.S. operations. 55 This will substantially
damage the American Banks’ competitive strength in the global markets.
2.

International impact: Various international regulatory bodies, banks and

other institutions have also commented on the proposed rule and brought the international
impact of the proposed rule to the Agencies’ attention. These comments emphasized on
50

There has been a latest exit by high-profile traders from traditional Wall Street firm, Morgan Stanley because of
the Volcker rule. Aaron Lucchetti, Morgan Stanley Team to Exit in Fallout from Volcker Rule, Wall Street Journal,
Jan 11, 2011 available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703779704576073841615141836.html
51
Supra note 43
52
Id.
53
Id.
Advisor Network, Volcker Rule is Out, How Much Will it Hurt, Forbes, Dec. 10, 2011- Speaking on a panel hosted
by New York University’s Stern School of Business last month, chief executive of JP Morgan’s investment bank
said that when the Volcker Rule was first introduced there were assurances made by regulators that other countries
“would fall in line but we haven’t seen that. Germany, France, China, Brazil. They didn’t follow us.”http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2011/10/12/volcker-rule-is-out-how-much-will-it-hurt/
54
Supra note 45
55
J. Scott Colestani et al., Faculty and Students of School of Law- Hofstra University, Statement of Comment on
the Volcker Rule (April 20, 2012) available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-563.pdf
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the cross-border effect of the financial regulations and the need to collaborate with the
affected countries.56 The opinion of foreign entities across the board is that they must be
excluded from the application of the rules 57 and that the definition of ‘control’ and
‘affiliate’ must be amended so as not to include such foreign joint ventures and foreign
subsidiaries, which are controlled by foreign banking groups.58
Individuals: Many commoners who save their money by way of

3.

conventional banking routes believe that the Volcker Rule is a necessary reform. They
question the very nature of the concept of proprietary trading, saying that the money that
the banks claim to be trading as theirs is originally their deposited savings.59 Individual
savers have taken the position that the bank must be regulated with respect to disposal of
funds that are essentially their deposits.60
4.

Ancillary entities: Various commenters, customers, buy-side market

participants, industrial and manufacturing businesses, treasurers of public companies and
other constituencies with different goals and interests have responded to the proposed
regulation with the view that the rule in its current form would have adverse effects on
them.61 Their contentions are regarding the following aspects of the Rule:
i)

The definition and scope of the concepts of ‘affiliate’ and ‘subsidiary’-

The use of the broad definitions creates a vast array of affiliates covered by the

56

Masamichi Kono, Vice Commissioner of International Affairs- Financial Services Agency of the Government of
Japan & Kenzo Yamamoto, Executive Director- Bank of Japan, Statement of Comment on the Volcker Rule (Dec
28, 2011) available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-78.pdf, See Sally Miller, Chief Executive
Officer- Institute of International Bankers, Statement of Comment on Volcker Rule- Interpretive Issues relevant to
International Banks (May 10, 2011) available at
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/documents/dfsubmission/dfsubmission28_051011-3.pdf, See also
Angela Knight, Chief Executive of the British Bankers Association, Statement of Comment on the Volcker Rule
(Feb. 13, 2012) available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-364.pdf
57
The reason behind this response is also the practical issue that the rules are home centric, reserving the regulatory
and supervisory roles for the American federal agencies leaving limited scope for accommodating the implications
on the other countries.
58
Supra note 4
59
Dave Donald, Statement of Comment on the Volcker Rule (Feb. 14, 2012) available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-358.htm
60
Margeret Risk, Statement of Comment on the Volcker Rule (Feb. 13, 2012) available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-442.htm,
Individuals responding to the rules referred to the banks as the ‘Banksters’. See Tina Gregory, Statement of
Comment on the Volcker Rule (February 13, 2012) available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111404.htm
61
Supra note 38
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Volcker Rule, all of which would be subject to prohibitions that were not meant for
non-financial firms.62
ii)

Scope of the term ‘covered funds’- The Proposed Rule collectively defines

private equity funds and hedge funds as covered funds.63 Though the objective of the
Rule appears to focus on private equity and hedge funds, the language also captures
numerous other corporate structures that are common within financial and nonfinancial firms that may be banking entities like centrally owned subsidiaries, joint
ventures, foreign funds, securitization vehicles, funding vehicles and government
sponsored programs.64 Therefore, the entities that are involved in diverse financial
and business services are expecting that the Agencies should use their discretion to
carve these entities out of the definition of covered funds, thereby avoiding these
disruptive consequences.65
5.

Academics: Some legal academics are among the few critics that sided

with the legislators with respect to the Volcker Rule. An analogy was drawn to describe
proprietary trading that it increased risk, just as casino gambling increases risk among
gamblers.66 They believe that the Volcker Rule is a critical and much needed control on
the speculative behavior of banks. It puts back into place some of the basic protections
that had protected our banks and their affiliates for six decades prior to the deregulatory
frenzy of the 1990s which witnessed legal systems that encouraged and subsidized

62

Brackett B. Denniston, Senior Vice-President and General Counsel- GE Company & David G. Nason, VicePresident GE Company and Chief Regulatory Officer- GE Capital, Statement of Comment on the Volcker Rule
(Feb. 13, 2012) available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-253.pdf. In their comment, they
expressed that thousands of affiliates of General Electric Capital Corporation that engage primarily or exclusively in
non-financial activities (such as those that operate primarily in the industrial, technological, manufacturing or
healthcare businesses) will be subject to the Volcker Rule's prohibitions, though an unintended consequence of the
rule.
63
Supra note 31, definitions of private equity and hedge funds have been discussed .
64
Supra note 62
65
Id. , In addition to the specific issues discussed, these entities estimate that the unintended consequences are
amplified when they are applied to nonfinancial holdings and affiliates of banking entities in terms of costs and
expenses.
66
Lynn Stout, Professor of Corporate and Securities Law- University of California Los Angeles, Statement of
Comment on the Volcker Rule (Feb. 13, 2012) available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111251.pdf
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speculative trading resulting in reduced returns, increased risks, and boom-and-bust
cycles.67
Though a few academics endorse the principle behind the Volcker Rule, they have
been expressing concern about the regulations that pose the threat of expanding the scope
of the rule beyond its intended purpose.68

VI.

CONCLUSION

With the enactment of the Volcker Rule under the Dodd Frank Act, the financial services
regulation has come a full circle in the United States. It has come back to where it started with
the Glass Steagall Act. Whether such a shift in the regulatory approach is what the economy
needs in the light of the innovation, complexity and distress that it has developed over the years,
is a question that is being asked pending the implementation of the legislation.
Banks having not enough ‘skin in the game’ has come as a bad news to the private equity
funds, which rely extensively on their significant connections with the banking entities in terms
of their capital as well as network and also to the banks, which have in most cases, been
rewarded for their highly leveraged loans. The federal agencies have till date been receiving
comments and recommendations on the proposed rules. What the outcome of this highly debated
issue between the conservative policy makers and the audacious business entities, is awaited by
the world.
Private equity has developed and grown to become an important source of funds for a
wide spectrum of business entities ranging from start-up, middle-market firms and large public
corporations to distressed organizations. Owing to its fundamental idea of organizational
innovation, it is in my opinion one of the most needed investment mechanisms for financial and
qualitative growth of businesses across the world in the current sluggish economic environment
and regulation must be carefully formulated without hampering this growth.
67

Id.
Ken Taymor, Executive Director- Berkeley Centre of Law, Business and Economy, University of Berkeley,
Statement of Comment on The Volcker Rule (Feb. 13, 2012) available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-4111/s74111-337.pdf See also Anat R. Admati and Paul Pfleiderer, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University,
Statement of Comments on the Implementation of the Volcker Rule (March 23, 2011) available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-360.pdf
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